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APPELLANT'S

CLOSING

BRIEF

I. RESPONDENT 1 S BRIEF VIOLATES I.A.R. , IS GLARINGLY
AVOIDING· OF RESPONDING TO APPELLANT/$ CITED AUTHORITIES, CONTROVERTED FACTS AND ISSUES; AND MISSTATES
GROSSLY THE ERRONEOUS RULINGS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Respondent GMAC 1 s ten (10) page brief does not address, refutate or deny .the cited case authorities or law
in

,ll.PPELLANns
BRIEF nor does it address
,,

directly and

with supported authorities the issues raised by Appellant.
Respondent does cite two cases, to wit: feathetston v.
Allstate Iris. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 875 P.2d 937 (1994) at
P3, for the most preliminary, but nowhere complete rutes,
of Summary Judgment; and P~fk0eit Hdmes, LLC

v.

Bifson

(mi s s p p~ 1 Ting Homes , as Hones ) , l 4 9 Id ah o 6 0 3 , 2 3 8 P . 3 d 2 0 3
(201d) at page 8, for the

plpposition: the district court, may

fix interpretation of the Decree of Summary Administration,
I. C.

l 5 - 3 - l 2 O5, 11 s u a s po n t e.

· ·!i~d1ng,s··~'; and

11

But

these aren 1t

the significant

1 e gal p r-i n c i pl es that a pp y here from Par kw est

which void in entirety GMAC 1 s complaint and most flagrantly
c o n t 1•.r i,v e d a n d p r e s e n t e d mi s u s e a n d a b u s e of p r o c e s s
defunct and

its

bY a

WITHOUT STANDING~-DISENFRANCHISED CORPORATION VIA A

PURPOR;TED NONDISCRIPT

~A G"!=:·Nf}:it:ATHLEEN
0

~f!TZGERALO.

The use of Fitz-

Gera.ldis rnie:>nve.ri.fi.cation· & Ja_ck_p;f standing/capacity, was to avoid
GMAC I s c 0 u n s e l c om mi t t i n g p e r j u r y o r s u b o.r fla t i o n t h e r e o f . Bu t s u c h
use ~as sttll fraudulaen. t~_ de.ce·pt,·_ye by · GMAC and its counsel.
l

Two

coriclusions are to be derlved from ~MAC's uncited

with no legal s:Uppori;edestaternent:S·
_-· to wit:
:..
.~

1)

Any such pur-

ported statements by GMAC are deemed waived and will not be
considered, but deerned unopt',osed, Bolen v. Ba'Ji:,er, 69 Idaho 93,
203 P.2d 375 (1949); and 2) GMAC's sole claim for claim and
d~lj

ry based upon false testimony or falsely contrived verifjcri-

...ti9'l!, beside being perjurio~s, is frivolous, unreasonable and
without foundation; Mikesell;~ v. Newsworld Dev. Corp, 122 Idaho
8 6 8, 8 4 0 P . 2 d 1O90 (Ct . App . 1 9 9 2 ) SANCTIONS l•! ERE/ ARE IN ORDER.:..
( Appellant refers to and incorporates herein his arguments,
statements and cited legll case and other law authorities from
his APPELLANT'S OPENING BiIEF, PG 1-3, 5-7, and 10-15, in
further support of his above requsted conclusions.)

2.

THE,PARKHES DEClSIIO'N 149 Idaho 840, s'UPP0RTS
ALL~ APP_E.i-'i:.-ANT' S APPEAL POINT~, ARGUMENTS AND
CALLS FOR THE GRANTING OF THIS APPEAL ON ALL P0INT5

ISSUE RAISED.
GMAC ' s i n r a i s i n g t h e q u e st i on

II

Di d GMAC Mi s 1 ea d or p,b u s e

the Process and Fail to State a t;-~l:ise of ,A.ction ·11 · , Usespdt's
Brief, P. 9) d{_en

·falsfl:y. 9-d:YiJ,nce~Cpa9e

9, its middle paragraph.

t h e r e of ) t h at " A 1 1 of t h E;' s e f a. c t s a r e u n d i. s p u t e d by Mr . Ba c hll ,
when i n point of fact and per Ru l e 5 6 Ca ) t h.r o ugh. (_ f¾

,

a 11 and

each of tb.e advanced facts by GMAC werencyt·: only disput.~d but also,
legally by Appellant's cited authorities, unsustainable.
?

Parkwest Homes,

LLC v. Barson, 149 Idaho, 238 P.3d 203

did not involve any determinations of any Degree of Summary
administration.

It factually deal with an unlicensed building
This Court

contractor verified claim under I.C. section 54-5208
held "the contractor must alleged and prove
registered (licensed) contractQI'.'

1

that he was a duly

or exempt from registration 'at

all times during the performance of such or contract.

1

11

(149

Idaho 60'.L 608-609)
Parkwest specifically h~,d· that the required verification
required the express statement that having read "the mechani.c I s
lien and know the contents thereof, the same is true of my own
knowledqe.
tract was

The district court

yq:,J.o· ·

held' that

the construction con-

since Parkwest was not registered at the time

it signed the contract.

(149 Idaho@ 608)

This Idaho Supreme Court , ci.ting Barry v. Pacific We.st
Const'n,

Inc. 140 Idaho 827, 832, further held it as well as

the district court had the same duty

to raise the issue of

ril·legality of the construction contract in question.

(149 Idaho

@ 608) PARKWEST's application establishes lack of jufiscidtion & faila
Moreover, th e purpose o f th e requ,. re d ver,. f ,. ca t 1. on to state
claim.

i s '1 a d es tr e t o frustrate th.e fiJtng of fri.Yolous claims.. " C@ 606).3
and to avoid the mandatory pleadi~requirements of IRCP Rule 9(a), 9(c) and 9(d).
3

-

GMAC' s comp l a int ' s fa i l u re to al l e g e the re q u i red pref i l in g
conditions of it, via either Semperian, Inc. or it's own corporate, authorized to do business in Idaho branches, of perfecting
per Idaho statutes, within the first four (4) months the vehicle
was licensed/registered in Idaho, fa4led to allege the required
,. found at i o n aJ co n d i t i on s of a c l a t m and de l i v e r y act i o n ,

Par kw e~s. t

v. Bafnson , 149 Idaho@ 608. GMAC has failed to state an action
for cl aim and delivery.

It has stated no other cl aims nor any

other cause of actio,n.

GMAC's summary judgment shou~d have been

dismissed with prejudice and Appellant should have been granted
~

summary judgment against GMAC.
See Fitzqefald v. Am-;erica:n Gen. Fin. Inc. (Bkrptcy D. Idaho

1998) {Jn.r-e Ps·alto) 225 Bankr.

753.

(Alse, pages 10-22, A.O.B.,

incorporated herein and reassertd in full as to all arguments and
authorities cited/raised.)
Moreover, for
ye hie le

GMAC to have wit~in four l4) months of said

being b. rough. t i_ n Id ah o and to be reg. iS; t ere d here, i t

was additionally required, beyond the statutes and legal authorities cited tn AppellantLs 0peni.n~ Brie~

to comply with I.C. 49-

5 Q 2 a n d 4 9 --5 04 C2 ) ( 3 ) C4 ) ~ wh i_ c h s t a t ut e s we r e n e v e r a l l e g e d i n t h e
unverified complaint nor raised as part of GMAC's motion initially
nor by any timely, relevantly, admiisble s~owing with certified
documents per v er i. f i e d prop. Q,flY a ff i d a y tt s,

/1

Se e ~ls o ' I -;' C. 4 9 - 5 0 6 )

Various pertient questions and actions were not
pursued nor taken, to wit:
1.

How was an undocumented emp1oy~e of s,emrerian

no 1on!'.ferauthorized to do busi.ness i.n Idaho
to work for Sew~etiari

Inc.,

but claiming

in Arizona have personal knowledge

of what exact contract of purchase was entered into by
Cindy L. Bach on Jan. 6, 2007 in Bozeman, Montana when no
representative nor au1y authorized agent was empowered to
act for, sign for and agree for both Semperian, Inc. and
GMAC?
2.

Jhat were the speific foundational facts of how,

what and when did Kathleen FitzGerald acquire as her knowledge
of the facts, when she was unwilling to verify,

under

oath

of the truth of smid facts of her own personal knowledge but
instead

on claimed
3.

11

and believed the facts therein." ?

How did she purportedly sign her one page verification

two (2) days before the complaint was
April

prepared and signed

22, 2009? (One can't incorporate by reference a document ~non exist~nt!)

(Appellant's Opening Brief's pagffi l through 14 are incorporated herein in further support.)
4.

If Kathleen FitzGerald was so knowleable of an Idaho Claim and

delivery action per I.e. J
Idah.0

1

s statute re

. why did she fail to comply with

within 4 months of fhe vehicle 1 sregisteration

in Idaho, a ,new.~security lien was to be per,ected butneither alleged, nor
•

''>

,

'

addressed in the complaint and was not proven by any of its averments??

5

GMAC and its counsel,

have, an employee of said non

franchised and withdrawn corporation, Semperian, Inc.
out capacfty or standing misrepresentati~ns

made with-

and misstatments, to

de pr i v e App e 11 an t of t he t it 1 e , u s e and f u 1 1 v a 1 ue of s a i d e:q u i nox,

Itis patently clear that such deception and subtrafuge

is ~r GMAC's consent, permission and its authority extended to
its attorney of record herein.

Buch deception and abuse of process

is there6ore admitted by GMAC and its attorney in pursuing a complaint on a single count, claim and delivery per I.C. 8-301
and as stated supra herein and in Appellant's Opening Brief,
it is admitting relevant and materail evidence agaisnt GMAC on
Appellant's counterclaim issues.

C~lTaha~ V. Wolfe 88 Idaho; 440,

400 P.2d 1938 (1965).
'

'

'

Rather than address Appellant's

No. 3, issue·, Whether the

district court judgment could personally and without notice, apply
his undisclosed, untestified and without authority or qualifications of his expert testimony, applying such undisclosed and
s u b,J e c t i_ v e 1y i MO \1 · v e d

f a c t s·

t o g r a nt s umm a r y

j

ud q rn e n t , i n d i s -

1!1tssi,n~ all issues of Appellant's counterclaims. (AOB, Pg
Re s po nd e n t

c o n vo 1-u t es · .

q nd

10 -34)

ayo t d s t be i, s s u e r a i s e d bY

the district court's void and without jurisdiction acti~n~,
6

3.

IT WASN'T PERSci~A( HEARSAY TESTIMONY WHICH THE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ON HIS OWN. SUA SPONTE, APPLIED
AND USED TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGM[NlL VIA - THE RUSE OF
JUDICrAL NOTICE: IT WAS UNAUTHORIZED AND UNPROVEN EXPERT TEST!.. MONY APPLIED~TOGRANT FULL SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENT
- ------------- -------------Respondent's Brief, pages 7-8,

District Courtinsert(

asks the question: "Did

the

) personil comments into its decisions

that were hearsay . . . . Mr. Bach asserts this issue on the basis
of the Court's comments pert~inipg to the weather conditions in
Teon County, Idaho as contained in its Memorandum Decision· R.
pgs 0090-0098 ..

. The Memorandum Decision was withdrawn

and replaced by the Amended Memorandum Decision dated September
3, 2010. R.p. 0141

The Court address these issues in its Amended

Me!J1orandum Decision. R. 0149-0151."
Respondent's statements are grossly incorrect, incomplete
and further misleading compoiundingly further deceptive.

Under

Part 2, of the initial referened MEMORANDUM DECISION, R. 0096
this is what the district court ruled and found as "evidence"
via "taking judical notice":
"2.

Mr. Bach's counterclaim is dismissed in its entirety.
Mr. Bach's counterclaim alleges various torts, breaches
of contract, fraud, and violations of consumer protection laws
by GMAC.
In particular, he alleges that GMAC slandered title
to_t~e Equinox, th~t GMAC was fraudulent in its actions perta1n1ng to the making of the contract and enforcing the contract,
andthat the vehicle is defective becuase the car's braking system
and four-whell drive did not operate safely in Teton County in
the winter . .
First, the Court takes judical notice that it is dangerous to drive in many plac~s in _Idaho during the winter, including
Teton Coanty . . Th.is
tri1e whether one
driving in an Eq,uj-n@x
d~· ~--$~6W~it.
Mr. Bach's mere assertion that there are braking
and four-wheil-drive problems with his vehicle in Teton County

·;s

is

7

is insufficient to allow GMAC to form an answer or put
notice as to complaint. Such claims do not meet even the
liberalplead.ing requirements of Rule 8(a)(l) and 9(f) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
These bare allegtatons, unsubstantiated py any admissi~le
expert testimony are also an inadequate response to GMAC's
judgment motions. Rather than provide the Court with some
expert testimony or other evidence of hi.s claims, Mr. Bach
has rest on the conclusory allegations in his counterclaim.
These allegations are insufficent to surviv summary judgment."
(R. 0096)
FIRST ,

The statements by the district court of what Appel-

lant pled in his counterclaims is grossly inaccurate and conttived.
Thi s Honor ab l e Court is ref erred to
are incorporated herein.

AO B, pages 5 through 7,

whi ch

The district court aforesaid three (3)

paragraphs are not just inapplicable, confusing and

misstating

of Affiant s Counterclaim, which was never the aubject matter, nor
1

addressed by GMAC's summary judgment motion.

SE£OND,

in the second quoted paragraph of the distr.ict

court's

referring what is true ( This is true whether one is driving in
11

an Equinox or a Snowcat,

11

such jddicial notice is unsupported and

irrelevantly inadmissi ble, add

immaterial.

Besides what section

of I.R.E., 201 does such no·: discript and unproven judical notice
statment is it based.

If the district court deems such judicial

notice information mandatory under r~R.E., Rule 201 (d) it required:
"When a party makes an oral or written request that a court
take judicial notice of recor~s, exhibits or transcripts from
the court file in the same or a separate case, the party shall
identify the specific documents or items for which the judicialn
noticeis requested or shall prooffer to the court and serve on
parties copies of such documents or itesm. A court shall take
judicial notice of requested by a party and supplied with the
necessary inofrmation. 11•
Neither Respondent nor the Court complied with such mandates.
8

Nor did the district court comply with the requirements of
I.R.E, Rule 20l(e)

give the right to Appellant at any time "to

an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judical
not i c e and the tenor of the matter not i c e d . ''
Under this second quot~ paragraph from the district ~ourt's
reasoning basis of including

11

a SNOWCAT", where, what and why did such

irre levan-.t and nonlicensed. vehicle become a fixation and focus
by the district court.

There is no statement/averment in the

counterclaim of Appellant of any aspect of a defense, affirmative
defense nor issuein any of his counterclaims which raises anywhere
theoperational characteristics, good bad or indifferent of a SNOWCAT!
T IRO

as Respondent's

summary judgment motion was solely

based and limited to only issue of his complaint per I.C. 8 301,
~~for claim and delivery, the subjects within said third and conclu-

c.,.~:~··:

l'i.·.:-...,,

ing paragraph, (R. 0096) by the district courtare way out of line,
nonsequitor and reveals that the district court per the second
above paragraph whi.ch starts with the words,

.jUdicial notice

"First the Court takes

that it is dang~rou~.to drive in many places in

Idaho during the winter, including Teton Coanty" is the district
court's

void and precluded testimony and what every unstated and

unpresented expert claims without foundationsl showing, etc.
A c o u r t j ud g e ·p re s i d i ng ma _y n Q t t e s t i f y . NQ o b j e c t i. o n n e e d be ma d e
to preserve th.i~s or any evi.dence he th_i_nki_s b. e ts competent as
a witness. r.R.E. Rule 605, A judge canoot ~ewar himself in and
then proceed to give expert opinions in violation of Rule 703;
moreover, ,an oath or affirmatton "shall be requi_red to declare
he will testify truthfully. I.R.E, Rule 603. Lastly, when was
given such notices and an opportunity to impeach said teYtimony?

FOURTH,·· Appell ant "s countercl ai:ms

weremandatory under IRCP,

13(a), a pleading under Rule 7(al and
ired

per Rule B(f) was req-

"shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."

REspondent never flled and there was not before the distric
court, at any time, nor when he was presented with respondent's
summary judgment motton, any motion for a more definite statement as to Appellant s mandatory counterclaim .per IRCP, Rule
1

l2(e).

Nor did Respondent at any time raise either formally

or otherwise a Rule l2(b)(6) motion nor argue or present any
memorandum tosupport a Rule l2(b)(6) motion with a set noticed
date for hearing.

No hearing ever focused on any of such TIMELY

AND PROPERLY SERVED FURTHER MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT WHICH IF MADE, HEARD AND GRANTED WOULD HAVE GRANTED LEAVE
!r

TO APPELLANT TO FILE AMENDED COUNTERCLAIMS.
At Respondent rs Brief, rage 8,
II

it is snidely stated:

In addition, the court not-ed that 'there is no

reason why such a statement would indicate any bias
Bae· by the Court.

against

Nevertheless, in order to clear the

record

unnecessary issues, the Court hs removed the statement from
th i. s amended order .

1
·

R• p . 0 l 5 O. 11

But even this sta~e~ent and q~ote of t~e district court
is accurate and deceptively deficient to correct any void effects
of what the district court did without authority, jurisdiction
Bnd in violatt:on of any testi.mony being pre 'luded by the I.R.E.,
Ru l e s

1

q u. o t e d u n d e r PAR T TH l RD~ SUp RA , p a g e g , h e r e O f .

the district court's

In

AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION, filed Sept 3,
l0

2010 (R 0141~1551 ,

it convolutedly and obfuscatfngly

attempted to justify and somewhat ameliorate h_is statements
in his said ffrst

Memorandum Deci~fon (supra, pages 6-8).

Starting at page 9, of his AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION,
(R. 149) under paragraph 'n(7) Bach's claims that he has been denied
a fair and impartial judge.~ (See and reference for incorporation the four (4) motions Appellant filedMay 17, 2010, R 00990109; especially starting with Rl02-0l09).
~l7) Bachi~ claims that he has been denied a fair and
i mp ar t i_ l a j u d g e .
Ba c h ar g u e s t hat h i s d u e p r o c e s s r i. g ht s h. av e b e e n v i o l a t e d
because he ha~been denied a fair and impartial judge. Although itis difficulat to discern the reasons for this, during
oral argument Bach focused on two actions by the trial judge:
(l) the Court 'taking judicial notice that it is is dangerous
to drive in many places in Idaho during the winter, including
Teton County, : 21 and (2) the Court assisting GMAC by opining
during the July 7, 2009 hearing that by taking the vehicle througha decree of summary administration, Bach assumed all
liab i l it y c o n n e c t e d t o t h e r,,~'ei Ri c l e .
The Idaho Rules of Evidence recognize that a trial court can
take judicial notice of the following adjudicated facts;
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is (l) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and
determination by reason of sources whose accuracy cannot be
reasonably questioned.
I.R.E. 20l(b) (Emphasis added).
The Court's recognition that Teton County, Idaho is an area
with severe winter weather is neither surpirsing nor a 1.ach.
Located only miles from the Grand Teton Mountains and ttfe Grand
Targhee Ski resort, such information is generally known throughout the Seventh Judicial District.
The admission of fuch gen9eneral knowledge hardly breaks any new legal ground. 2 More

- 11

importantly, there is no reason why such a statement would
indicate any bias against Bach by the Court. Nevertheless,
in order to clear the record of unnecessary issues, the Court
has removed that statement from this amended order.
Likewise, the Court's reference to the legal impact of
Bach's summary administration is niether inapbropirate nor
indicative of bias. The Court is not requied to base its
legal analysis of an issue solely on the issues raised by
the attorneys. In the recent case of Parkw~st Homes LLC v.
Barnson, ---P.3d --, (2010 WL 2541022, June 25, 2010), the
appe 11 ant argued that the trial courtin sua sponte raising· the
issue of illegality. The Idaho Supreme Court hela:
The distict court did not err in sua sponte raising
that issue. In Barry we held that "this Court has a
duty to r a i s e the 1 s s-u e of i 11 e gal i ty . I' _id . , and the
d t s tr i c t c Q u rt h. ad t h. e $ ~me d u t y .
2010 WL 2541022*5, (citing Barry v. Pacific West Construction
Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 832.: 103 P.3d 440, 445 (2004).
While the Court concedes it may not have been a duty to
raise the issue, such as in the case of legality or mootness,
it was certainly not error for it to do so. A trial court
judge is not required to disregard his knowledge of the inAPPLICABLE LAW IN DECIDING AN ISSUE . . " (R. 0149-0150)
The di st r i ct court , then on page l l ( R. al 54 l u n d e-r " I I .
Bach's Counterclaims are Dismissed.", repeated the first 3
paragraphs as set forth UNDER part "2. (pages 7-8 supra herein)
BUT deleting the very FIRST sentence of the second paragraph,
and st art i ng said par a graph " . . Bach I s mere assert i on that~:
tb_ere ~re liraki:ng and four-wheel-drive problems with his vehicle
~n Teton County is insufficient to allow GMAC to form an answer or put them on notice as to complaint . . . "(R. 0151)
(The ,,gistrict court judge then went on/continued to deny
all of Appellant's motionsincluding his motion to amend his counterclaims pursuant to IRCP 15(a) and {b). (r. 0151-0;54) Bur the
district court added somewhat accusatorially:
The timing of Bach's
request for leaue to amend i~ al~d troubling. It was only after
the Courtgranted GMAC's motion for summary judgment that he brought
this motion. Itis not fair to GMAC to win on summary judgment,
only,to have the pleadings completely reqritten so that Bach has new
survyvingclaims. .
(R. 0154)
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11
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Appellant contends and argues that it is not fair for the
district court on its own, without notice to appellant, to
expand, include and sua sponte expand and add to Respondent's
motion for summary judgment

which was noticed and limited only

Respondent's to such motion to the unverified complaint for
summary judgment on the claim and delivery single action per I.C.
8-301 and did not notice nor raise summary judgment on Appel
lant s numerous cunterclaism. The district court's sua sponte
expansion of such unmade, timely and procedurally of its motion
for summary judgment on Appellabt 1 s counterclaism and its above
quoted reasons were above
and beyond the issues of Rule 56.
..
Fuller v. Dave,c,a:,iT>iister (Idaho 2011} 252 P.3d 1266, 1269 ( The
party against whom the (summary judgment will be entered must be
given adequate notice and an opportunity to demonstrate why sum
mpry judgment should not he entered~ It is also true that a distric1
may notdecide an issue ndt rafsed in the moving party's motion for
s Um ni a r y Ju dgrri e nt . ' Em p h a s i s a ad e d } ; Po s ey · v . F o r d Mot o r c r e d i t
Co., 141 Idaho 477, 11 P3d 162 (Ct. App. 2005)
1

.

"

11

1

(

Moreover, the district court judge exhibited morethan a cont-inuiffg patent · bias and prejudice against Appellant's arguements
and deliberately sought to restate such arguments inaccurately
in his concern for what the record, oral and written may otherwise
reveal and contain. The district court judge had further exhibiWd
patent and obvious prejudice and ~t~se against Appellant that
he was deprived of his rights, procedurally and substantively
to due process and equal protettions under the U.S. Constiution s
Fourteenth Amendment. Litkey \i. U.S. 1994 (1994) 510 U.S. 551;
1

.

/41

Dwlsey v.I.A.C. (2005)t.Jdaho 125, ct App.
Respori'din't'$'btiefcontinues to compound and confirm that i it indeed h.as abuse the process of the Court and fatled to state a cause of action
claim and deli.very; th.at ts used~ advanced and mi_srepresented a clearjy VOID
and unveri:fied cl aim to bbtai.n il legihly via a further i_ssued VOID WRIT OF
POSSESSION Of

·[qutnox, and pfoceed tn a wholly unreasonably

commercial manher,never selling it at any noticed or properly
held public auction--neither giving appellant credit nor proof of
13

fu]l and complete monetary value was paid for it.

Respondent

Brief admits that the district court and it more than misapplied
and abused the process of the void and criminal actions per
aits lack of jurisdiction claim and delivery action to deprive
Appell ant's constitutional rights to due process and equal prot e c t i o n , i g n o r i ng t h e - d e c i s i o n o f

t hi s

' I da'. ho · Su p r em e Co ur t of

Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603,608.

Appellant

refers to and incorporates specifically all statements and
arguments, pages 2-7, supra.
For allth.e foregoing reasons, statements and arguments
set forth, supra, Respondent

GMAC was not entitled nor with

standing or capacity to obtain any judgment, nor damages, nor
attorney's fees before the district court nor per this appeal - .
CONCLUSION:

Appellant's appeal should be granted herein, with

remand to the,district court to dismiss with prejudice

Respondent's

void and without jurisdiction claim and delivery sole, a'ction
count and reinstating and proceeding with the counterclaims to
a jury
DAT50:

trial before a newly assigned impartial and unbiased judge.
September 23, 2011

Appellant
Pro Per
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CERTJFIGATE OF SERVJCE BY OVERNIGHT
'~AIL.TO TH£ CLERK, IDAHO SUPREME COURT

I, the undersigned , cert i_f y that on September, 2 3 , 20 l O,

r,

dtd servi:ce via overnight U.S. Mai.l, an original, plus
seven (7 cop ies and one additional unbound copy for
computer filing to the CLERK, IDAHO SUPREME COURT, P.O.
Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 13720-0101; and further, served
two (2) bound copies to opposing counsel via the U.S.
first class postage affixed thereto, to: Laura E. Burri,
P.O. Box 2773, Boise, ID 83701 ·
DATED: September 23, 2010
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